In our last post, we discussed differences between “pay to stay” arrangements, which face stricter scrutiny in bankruptcy cases, and “Produce Value for Pay” plans, which provide incentives for executives based on strong corporate performance.  As promised, we now examine two cases that illustrate acceptable ways for companies to motivate their executives to perform through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The first is the case of Chassix Holdings, Inc., which manufactures parts for approximately two-thirds of automobiles made in North America.  After a sequence of unfortunate financial and operational setbacks during 2014, Chassix found itself a petitioner under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code last month.  Included among the operational setbacks was the fact that approximately 1,100 employees voluntarily left Chassix during 2014.  Since it was critical to have a work force with the proper experience, skill, and know-how to manufacture the auto parts, Chassix found itself exploring ways to enhance its compensation options prior to the petition date in order to retain more of its employees.  Unfortunately, it didn’t finish these plans prior to the petition date.

Chassix took a couple of important steps in designing its KERP and seeking authority from the bankruptcy court to implement it.  First, and foremost, it limited its KERP to a pool of employees who were not company “insiders.”  Therefore, the bankruptcy court applied the more liberal standard of business judgment when it evaluated the plan, even though Chassix had not established and regularly implemented the plan before its bankruptcy petition.  Under this standard, and considering the pre-petition employee turnover and the support of the various creditor constituencies, the bankruptcy court approved the KERP. 

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation

At the outset, the answer to the question posed in this article seems simple: employers should just pay their employees as much as is reasonably possible.  However, when a corporation finds itself in Chapter 11 reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code restricts the use of some traditional motivational methods.  Simultaneously, competitors might make tempting job offers to quality employees, inducing them to leave the business.  This combination of factors can distract employees from the main task of getting the debtor through the reorganization process. 

To provide sufficient compensation and persuade employees to remain with the business, a debtor can attempt to adopt a key employee retention plan (KERP for short), also known as a “pay to stay” arrangement.  This is in contrast to a “Produce Value for Pay” plan that provides incentives for strong corporate performance.

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation

Big Brother is watching you, or at least tracking your movements through your smartphone. According to the Washington Post, employers have steadily increased their use of GPS-enabled technology to track the movements and location of “field employees” like salespeople and delivery drivers. In fact, a 2012 study by the Aberdeen Group cited an increase of over 30% in the tracking of employees over the previous 5 years. Legitimate reasons exist to track field employees, such as making sure that drivers take the best routes and sales calls are conducted efficiently. But it’s more tricky to justify the tracking of employees who are off the clock.  For example, Myrna Arias, a former sales executive with Intermex, was allegedly fired for disabling a tracking app called Xora StreetSmart when she was off duty. Now Ms. Arias has sued the company, alleging wrongful termination and invasion of privacy. Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst at the ACLU, cautions employers against collecting off-the-clock data, because it opens the door to discriminatory practices. Mr. Stanley wondered, "What happens if an employer doesn't like the choices a worker makes in their personal lives and retaliates professionally?" 

We discussed emerging trends in the c-suite recently, and found that companies are increasingly tying executive compensation to performance. For those that do not, we can imagine a corporate shareholder version of peasants storming the castle with pitchforks in hand, thanks to say-on-pay voting. In the case of JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon’s 2014 compensation, the shareholders’ rebellion led to a relatively low approval rate for Dimon’s and other executives’ compensation. According to USA Today, 61.4% of shareholders approved the payouts, which starkly contrasts with an average 90% approval rating for companies that seek shareholder input on salary and bonus plans. Advisory firm ISS encouraged shareholders to rebuke the plan when they learned of Dimon’s $7.4 million cash bonus. ISS advised that “[t]he reintroduction of a large discretionary cash bonus in the CEO’s pay mix, without a compelling rationale, has substantially weakened the performance-basis of his pay.” If corporate leadership can provide a strong rationale for a big bonus, it’s more likely that the shareholders will drop their pitchforks and fall in line. 

• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation
• Poaching
• Termination With or Without Cause

Federal prosecutors recently indicted David Colletti, a former VP of marketing with MillerCoors LLC, on charges relating to a scheme to embezzle $7 million from the beer brewing giant. Mr. Colletti, a thirty-year veteran of the company, allegedly broke bad by conspiring with others to defraud the company through fictitious invoices for promotional and other events that were never held. According to Law 360, MillerCoors sued its former marketing executive for $13.3 million last year in an effort to recover for the alleged fraud. Prosecutors claim that Mr. Colletti and his co-conspirators used the proceeds to purchase collectible firearms, golf and hunting trips, and—perhaps inspired by Pink Floyd—even bought an arena football team. 

Nanoventions Holdings is a Georgia company that designs and manufactures microstructure technology used to prevent the counterfeiting of such things as currency, driver’s licenses, and event tickets. In 2011, $2 million went missing, and an investigation revealed that that its CFO, Steve Daniels, allegedly forged checks and converted funds to his own use as owner of a company called BIW Enterprises. In an interesting twist, BIW is engaged in the business of growing and distributing marijuana in California. According to Courthouse News Service, the company is suing Mr. Daniels for compensatory, treble and punitive damages under Georgia RICO statutes, and related causes of action.  If the allegations are true, one might find a historical equivalent to these events in the 1920s, when the president of the Loft Candy Company stole thousands of dollars to buy Pepsi-Cola out of bankruptcy.  Loft Candy ended up owning Pepsi on the basis that it was a stolen corporate opportunity.  If Georgia shared Colorado’s stance on marijuana legalization, would the court award ownership of the pot business to Nanoventions?  Oh what a difference a century makes.

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation
• Trade Secrets
• White Collar Crime

Doug Parker, the Chairman and CEO of American Airlines, has just joined a small cadre of executives who earn no salaries. Before anyone starts a GoFundMe page for Mr. Parker, consider that his 2015 compensation consists of 207,672 restricted stock units, the value of which will depend upon the airline’s performance. According to the Wall Street Journal, the stock units could amount to compensation in the range of $10.7 million if calculated using the current stock price of $51.40. By comparison, Mr. Parker earned $12.3 million in 2014, 40% of which was cash in the form of a $700,000 base salary and annual cash incentives. Mark Reilly, head of Verisight, Inc., a firm of executive compensation consultants, told the Journal that this type of compensation structure is more often found in companies facing financial hardship, and the lack of salary is offset by more generous stock awards. In the case of an executive in an established, mature industry, the message seems to be that Mr. Parker believes in the stock and that he is willing to tie his compensation to its performance.  Given US Airways’ performance since its merger with American in 2013, this wouldn’t seem like an incredible risk on his part. The combined company “has soared to record profit and its stock has climbed 42% in the past year.”

• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation
• Wrongful Termination

Last summer, we covered in depth the resounding repercussions from American Apparel’s decision to terminate its CEO and founder, Dov Charney.  Now, the sequel has arrived – and it promises lots of action.

Matt Townsend of Bloomberg Business reports that Charney has resumed his arbitration against his former employer, in which he is seeking $40 million from the clothing company.  Charney previously agreed to put his claims on hold while American Apparel made its final decision about whether to terminate him.  After an investigation, the board decided in December to cut Charney loose. 

• Arbitration
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation

            In the previous blog post, we discussed the ongoing bankruptcy litigation between Crystal Cathedral Ministries and its founder Dr. Robert Schuller over the rejection of his Transition Agreement.  That contract purported to spell out the relationship between the parties as Dr. Schuller stepped aside from his post as senior pastor.  The determination of whether that agreement was intended to be an employment agreement, and subject to the strict limitations of section 502(b)(7), or a retirement benefit which is not so limited, is pending before the Supreme Court.  However, Dr. Schuller’s case also presented other interesting issues that could be instructive for other employers.

            In addition to his claim for damages based on the rejection of the Transition Agreement, Dr. Schuller sought compensation from tCrystal Cathedral (the bankruptcy debtor) in an undetermined amount, for allegedly improper use of his intellectual property.  The intellectual property, which consisted of more than 35 years of books, sermons and other writings, had been produced by Dr. Schuller while he was employed by the debtor as its senior pastor.  Dr. Schuller, individually and through a wholly owned corporation, asserted a copyright to these materials.  Under the Transition Agreement between the debtor and Dr. Schuller, the intellectual property was made available to the debtor for use pursuant to a royalty free license. 

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation
• Intellectual Property

Transition for corporate leadership is frequently complex.  When the transition involves a charismatic founder, this step can be even more stressful.  Planning well in advance for the inevitable segue between leaders and outlining the respective roles of both new and departing management can help, but may not fully resolve the issues.  A recent decision involving Crystal Cathedral Ministries, the megachurch founded by famed televangelist Dr. Robert H. Schuller, reflects how nuanced this process can be.  Because this case presents many issues of corporate succession, it provides a gateway for discussing various employment issues that may crop up in a corporate reorganization.  We will focus on the case in a series of articles designed to spotlight these issues.  

            Dr. Schuller founded the Crystal Cathedral in the 1950s.  Later, Crystal Cathedral Ministries was formally incorporated in 1970 with Dr. Schuller as the senior pastor.  During his 36-year tenure in this position, Dr. Schuller wrote numerous books and gave countless sermons and other talks, particularly in his role as the executive creator and director of content for The Hour of Power, a weekly television show produced by Crystal Cathedral Ministries.  In exchange for these services, Dr. Schuller received a salary and benefits, including a housing allowance and health insurance.

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation
• Severance Agreements

Helen of Troy isn’t just a famous mythological beauty.  It’s also a publicly traded maker of personal care products.  And now, it and its directors are defendants in a suit by Helen of Troy’s founder, Gerald “Jerry” Rubin.

Executives who bring suit against their former employers frequently want to show that they were terminated for reasons other than performance, and Rubin is no different.  In his complaint, as reported by El Paso Inc., Rubin describes the history of Helen of Troy and its staggering growth.  From humble origins – a “wig shop in El Paso, Texas” – Helen of Troy grew into a “global consumer products behemoth, generating revenues in excess of approximately 1.3 billion dollars.”  And then the roof caved in.  Rather than “celebrating [Rubin’s] extraordinary success,” Rubin alleges, Helen of Troy’s directors turned on him in order to save their own skins, and eventually forced him out of the company.

Why did the directors need to sacrifice Rubin to save their positions?  According to Rubin, the answer lies with an entity called Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”).  ISS is a proxy advisory firm that conducts analysis of corporate governance issues and advises shareholders on how to vote.  Because shareholders often follow ISS’s recommendations, it can have substantial influence over the affairs of publicly-traded companies.  Indeed, some participants in a recent SEC roundtable suggested that ISS could have “outsized influence on shareholder voting,” or even that it has the power of a “$4 trillion voter” because institutional investors rely on it to decide how to vote.

Rubin alleges that if ISS decides a CEO is making too much money, it will demand that the compensation be cut or that the CEO be fired.  If its demand isn’t followed, it will “engineer the removal of the board members through [a] negative vote recommendation.”  Board members then will cave to ISS’s wishes to preserve their own positions.

Rubin claims that this is what happened in his case.

• Breach of Contract
• Executive Compensation
• Indemnification and Advancement
• Severance Agreements
• Termination With or Without Cause

A bankruptcy can be hazardous to the health of an executive’s bonus check.  Sometimes, however, an executive can survive an attack on a bonus in a bankruptcy, and come out clean on the other side.  For example, we covered here how one executive succeeded in keeping most of his incentive payments based on the timing of those payments. 

Now, we have another lesson in how executives can keep their bonus checks despite a bankruptcy, from Judge Christopher S. Sontchi of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  The company at issue in the case was Energy Future Holdings, Corp. (EFH), a holding company with a portfolio of Texas electricity retailers.  EFH filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April of this year.

• Bankruptcy
• Civil Litigation
• Executive Compensation