The turn of the calendar is always a good time to reflect on what has come before and preview what lies ahead. In this post, we count down our most popular posts of 2015 about executive disputes. Later, we’ll look at what to expect in 2016.
When an executive and a company enter into a lucrative severance package, those benefits aren’t necessarily ironclad.
As we covered in this June 2014 post, when a company declares bankruptcy, its trustee can ask the court to allow the company to avoid its executives’ severance rights.
F-Squared Investments Inc. is now seeking to do precisely that. In late October, F-Squared moved to reject its separation agreement with former CEO Howard Present, seeking authority “to avoid the financial burden” of making a $500,000 payment to him and to cease the accrual of his COBRA payments.
Mr. Present and F-Squared have had a troubled couple of years.
In our last post, we discussed differences between “pay to stay” arrangements, which face stricter scrutiny in bankruptcy cases, and “Produce Value for Pay” plans, which provide incentives for executives based on strong corporate performance. As promised, we now examine two cases that illustrate acceptable ways for companies to motivate their executives to perform through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
The first is the case of Chassix Holdings, Inc., which manufactures parts for approximately two-thirds of automobiles made in North America. After a sequence of unfortunate financial and operational setbacks during 2014, Chassix found itself a petitioner under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code last month. Included among the operational setbacks was the fact that approximately 1,100 employees voluntarily left Chassix during 2014. Since it was critical to have a work force with the proper experience, skill, and know-how to manufacture the auto parts, Chassix found itself exploring ways to enhance its compensation options prior to the petition date in order to retain more of its employees. Unfortunately, it didn’t finish these plans prior to the petition date.
Chassix took a couple of important steps in designing its KERP and seeking authority from the bankruptcy court to implement it. First, and foremost, it limited its KERP to a pool of employees who were not company “insiders.” Therefore, the bankruptcy court applied the more liberal standard of business judgment when it evaluated the plan, even though Chassix had not established and regularly implemented the plan before its bankruptcy petition. Under this standard, and considering the pre-petition employee turnover and the support of the various creditor constituencies, the bankruptcy court approved the KERP.
At the outset, the answer to the question posed in this article seems simple: employers should just pay their employees as much as is reasonably possible. However, when a corporation finds itself in Chapter 11 reorganization, the Bankruptcy Code restricts the use of some traditional motivational methods. Simultaneously, competitors might make tempting job offers to quality employees, inducing them to leave the business. This combination of factors can distract employees from the main task of getting the debtor through the reorganization process.
To provide sufficient compensation and persuade employees to remain with the business, a debtor can attempt to adopt a key employee retention plan (KERP for short), also known as a “pay to stay” arrangement. This is in contrast to a “Produce Value for Pay” plan that provides incentives for strong corporate performance.
Earlier this month, we posted about the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s decision that a credit union’s insurance policy was not invalid from the start because of its employee’s misrepresentations on the application. The decision, National Credit Union Administration Board, as Liquidating Agent of St. Paul Croatian Federal Credit Union v. CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., also illustrates other arguments that insurers may make in denying coverage for claims under D&O policies or reserving their rights to litigate later. In this post, we explore how the court determined whether St. Paul “discovered” the loss more than two years before it filed suit against its insured, in which case its lawsuit would have been barred by a suit limitations period.
To briefly recap the facts of the case, St. Paul Croatian Federal Credit Union (“St. Paul”) and its insurer, CUMIS, agreed that a St. Paul bank manager, Mr. Raguz, had engaged in fraud by creating fake loans and accepting bribes. St. Paul eventually collapsed and was taken over by regulators. The liquidator appointed to administer St. Paul’s assets made a claim for its losses against CUMIS under a bond policy it had issued in favor of St. Paul. CUMIS responded not only by claiming that the bond policy was invalid from its inception because Mr. Raguz made material misrepresentations in obtaining and renewing it, but also because the policy stated that “legal proceedings” to recover loss from CUMIS had to be “brought within two years of Discovery of Loss.” Under the policy, “Discovery occur[ed] when [St. Paul] first become aware of facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume that a loss of a type covered under this Bond has been or will be incurred, regardless of when the act or acts causing or contributing to such loss occurred.”
To support its contention that St. Paul was aware of the loss long before it brought suit, CUMIS argued that the St. Paul board of directors were aware of two “critical facts” about the fraud, which would have led a reasonable person to assume a loss. First, CUMIS claimed that the delinquency rate of zero for the loan portfolio was unreasonable given its size, and that the directors should have known this fact more than two years before the lawsuit. In addition, CUMIS claimed that the directors should have known of the fraud more than two years in advance because the loan portfolio included $131.2 million of loans that were purportedly secured by deposits, even though in fact there were only $122.5 million of deposits securing the loans.
Federal prosecutors recently indicted David Colletti, a former VP of marketing with MillerCoors LLC, on charges relating to a scheme to embezzle $7 million from the beer brewing giant. Mr. Colletti, a thirty-year veteran of the company, allegedly broke bad by conspiring with others to defraud the company through fictitious invoices for promotional and other events that were never held. According to Law 360, MillerCoors sued its former marketing executive for $13.3 million last year in an effort to recover for the alleged fraud. Prosecutors claim that Mr. Colletti and his co-conspirators used the proceeds to purchase collectible firearms, golf and hunting trips, and—perhaps inspired by Pink Floyd—even bought an arena football team.
Nanoventions Holdings is a Georgia company that designs and manufactures microstructure technology used to prevent the counterfeiting of such things as currency, driver’s licenses, and event tickets. In 2011, $2 million went missing, and an investigation revealed that that its CFO, Steve Daniels, allegedly forged checks and converted funds to his own use as owner of a company called BIW Enterprises. In an interesting twist, BIW is engaged in the business of growing and distributing marijuana in California. According to Courthouse News Service, the company is suing Mr. Daniels for compensatory, treble and punitive damages under Georgia RICO statutes, and related causes of action. If the allegations are true, one might find a historical equivalent to these events in the 1920s, when the president of the Loft Candy Company stole thousands of dollars to buy Pepsi-Cola out of bankruptcy. Loft Candy ended up owning Pepsi on the basis that it was a stolen corporate opportunity. If Georgia shared Colorado’s stance on marijuana legalization, would the court award ownership of the pot business to Nanoventions? Oh what a difference a century makes.
In the previous blog post, we discussed the ongoing bankruptcy litigation between Crystal Cathedral Ministries and its founder Dr. Robert Schuller over the rejection of his Transition Agreement. That contract purported to spell out the relationship between the parties as Dr. Schuller stepped aside from his post as senior pastor. The determination of whether that agreement was intended to be an employment agreement, and subject to the strict limitations of section 502(b)(7), or a retirement benefit which is not so limited, is pending before the Supreme Court. However, Dr. Schuller’s case also presented other interesting issues that could be instructive for other employers.
In addition to his claim for damages based on the rejection of the Transition Agreement, Dr. Schuller sought compensation from tCrystal Cathedral (the bankruptcy debtor) in an undetermined amount, for allegedly improper use of his intellectual property. The intellectual property, which consisted of more than 35 years of books, sermons and other writings, had been produced by Dr. Schuller while he was employed by the debtor as its senior pastor. Dr. Schuller, individually and through a wholly owned corporation, asserted a copyright to these materials. Under the Transition Agreement between the debtor and Dr. Schuller, the intellectual property was made available to the debtor for use pursuant to a royalty free license.
Transition for corporate leadership is frequently complex. When the transition involves a charismatic founder, this step can be even more stressful. Planning well in advance for the inevitable segue between leaders and outlining the respective roles of both new and departing management can help, but may not fully resolve the issues. A recent decision involving Crystal Cathedral Ministries, the megachurch founded by famed televangelist Dr. Robert H. Schuller, reflects how nuanced this process can be. Because this case presents many issues of corporate succession, it provides a gateway for discussing various employment issues that may crop up in a corporate reorganization. We will focus on the case in a series of articles designed to spotlight these issues.
Dr. Schuller founded the Crystal Cathedral in the 1950s. Later, Crystal Cathedral Ministries was formally incorporated in 1970 with Dr. Schuller as the senior pastor. During his 36-year tenure in this position, Dr. Schuller wrote numerous books and gave countless sermons and other talks, particularly in his role as the executive creator and director of content for The Hour of Power, a weekly television show produced by Crystal Cathedral Ministries. In exchange for these services, Dr. Schuller received a salary and benefits, including a housing allowance and health insurance.
A D&O liability policy protects key individuals in a corporate structure. These individuals are likely targets for shareholder frustration if an entity is underperforming or suffering from other troubles. In addition, they may be exposed to personal scrutiny from regulators if the corporation is investigated for any wrongdoing. As previously discussed in this space, an insurance policy can provide more reliable protection for the indemnification rights of the officers and directors in times of financial distress because corporations plagued by regulatory or other legal problems frequently suffer financial setbacks. However, when a bankruptcy results from the financial troubles, not all insurance policies offer the same protection for the payment of fees and expenses for its directors and officers.
Under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor’s liability insurance policy is the property of a bankruptcy estate and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, including the automatic stay. There is considerable disagreement among the courts over whether the proceeds of the policy are also property of the estate. The actual determination of whether the proceeds are property of the estate is made on a case by case basis and is controlled by the express language and scope of the policy.
When the D&O policy only provides direct coverage to the debtor, there is little doubt that the proceeds are part of the debtor’s estate and are to be administered by the Bankruptcy Court for the benefit of all creditors. Similarly, when the policies only provide direct coverage to the individuals for their indemnification claims courts generally hold that the bankruptcy estate has no interest in the proceeds. However, when the policy provides direct coverage to both the debtor and the directors and officers, the proceeds will be property of the estate if depletion of the proceeds would have an adverse effect on the estate. Depletion of the proceeds will be construed to have an adverse effect on the estate if the policy proceeds actually protect the estate’s other assets from diminution.
Corporate directors and officers may think indemnification provisions are sufficient to protect them from claims asserted against them by shareholders or regulators. However, if a director or officer chooses to rely solely on indemnification in bylaws or contracts, and ignores the availability of directors & officers (“D&O”) liability insurance, he or she could be making a significant mistake. In particular, a D&O policy can offer these individuals more reliable protection in times of financial distress. When corporations are plagued by regulatory or other legal problems, they may also suffer from financial setbacks, eventually leading to bankruptcy proceedings. The manner in which a bankrupt corporation has provided for the payment of fees and expenses for its directors and officers may be critical to the individuals affected.
Under section 502(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim for indemnification is subordinated to the class of claims in which the underlying claim is placed. This means that, to the extent that the directors and officers are jointly liable with the corporation to a third party on an adverse claim, they will not receive any distribution on their resulting indemnification claim unless, and until, all of the claims of the class in which the underlying obligation is placed have been paid in full. This provision is intended to provide for equality of distributions in favor of all similarly situated creditors: if the underlying claim receives payments from both the corporation and the director and officer defendants and then the defendants receive payment on account of any contributions they made on the claim, that claim will have received a higher rate of distribution at the expense of other creditors.