Recent Developments in the “Change in the Law” Reason for Compassionate Release

Over the last several years, thousands of incarcerated individuals have filed motions for compassionate release.¹ As part of the submission process, individuals must outline the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that warrant a reduction in their sentence.
  
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act (the “FSA”). Along with several other measures aimed at criminal legal reform, the FSA allowed individuals to file compassionate release petitions on their own behalf and also implemented a restriction on the “stacking” of mandatory minimum twenty-five-year sentences in certain cases involving weapons during the commission of a crime.² The FSA specifies that the anti-stacking amendment is not retroactive—in other words, it does not apply to sentences finalized before the law’s enactment.³

In light of the FSA and the anti-stacking amendment, a number of additional incarcerated individuals have sought compassionate release by claiming that this change in the law qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. However, federal courts have varied in their interpretation and application of the “change in the law” rationale, particularly with respect to the anti-stacking amendment.

Several circuits, such as the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, have viewed the anti-stacking amendment as potentially meeting the “extraordinary and compelling” standard for compassionate release.⁴ Other circuits—such as the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits—have not.⁵ 

In 2023, and partly in response to the emerging circuit split, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) issued an amended policy statement which added “change[s] in the law” to the list of potential extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.⁶ Under the policy statement, changes in the law may qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons only if the change would “produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed” under the change.⁷

In March 2025, the Seventh Circuit examined the applicability of the anti-stacking amendment to compassionate release petitions in light of the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement. The defendant in United States v. Black sought review of his denied release petition.  In the underlying petition, he cited the anti-stacking amendment as the only reason for his release. The Seventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s denial of defendant’s petition, holding that the court’s interpretation of “extraordinary and compelling” supersedes that of the Sentencing Commission, and that the FSA’s anti-stacking amendment does not qualify as a reason on its own to reduce a petitioner’s sentence.⁸  

The Seventh Circuit also determined that classifying the anti-stacking amendment as an extraordinary and compelling reason would conflict with the anti-stacking amendment itself, which prohibits retroactivity.⁹  

Several days ago, the Sixth Circuit held that the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement is invalid because it is “unreasonable under the [compassionate release] statute” and seeks to “overrule” prior decisions of the courts.¹⁰

This trend away from the Sentencing Commission’s guidance raises certain considerations for individuals seeking compassionate release after the issuance of the amended policy statement, and counsel representing compassionate release petitioners. As these recent decisions indicate, the petitioner’s location may impact the substance of their release petition if they hope to use the “change in the law” reasoning (particularly in cases involving the anti-stacking amendment).  Thus, individuals—particularly those bringing petitions in states where courts reject the anti-stacking amendment as an extraordinary and compelling reason—should consider presenting other “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, such as those related to their health,¹¹ when seeking compassionate release (and not rely solely on a change in the law).  

In addition, these decisions raise questions about the extent of courts’ deference to the Sentencing Commission. Congress expressly delegated authority to define “extraordinary and compelling” to the Sentencing Commission.¹² Courts should interpret the compassionate release statute consistent with that delegation but may override the Sentencing Commission in their own reading of the statute.¹³
  
Until this split is resolved, and in light of the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement, compassionate release petitioners face uncertainty on whether and to what degree courts will defer to the Sentencing Commission’s definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons—at least as applied to the FSA. 

¹ United States Sentencing Commission, Compassionate Release Data Reports (Apr. 7, 2025), available at  https://www.ussc.gov/research/data-reports/compassionate-release-data-reports.  Petition grant rates tend to be relatively low, for example, federal courts granted approximately sixteen percent of the submitted petitions in 2024. Id.   
² See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194 (2018); United States v. Black, 131 F.4th 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2025).  Prior to the FSA, individuals with multiple charges under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) would receive a mandatory minimum of 25 years for each subsequent charge after the first (even if all the charges arose from the commission of the same crime).  Black, 131 F.4th at 543.    
³ Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194.
⁴ See, e.g., United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 24-26 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286-88 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2021). 
₅ See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 260–61 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1050 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 585–86 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2022). 
⁶ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023); United States Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines at 5-6 (Apr. 27, 2023), available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/202305_RF.pdf.  
⁷ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (2023). 
⁸ Black, 131 F.4th at 547-48. 
⁹ Id. 
¹⁰ United States v. Bricker, No. 24-3286, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025). 
¹¹ See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) (2023) (listing medical circumstances, age, family circumstances, and abuse as examples of extraordinary and compelling reasons).
¹² 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).  
¹³ See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 395, 413 (2024) (“And when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.”)